

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 11, 2013

MEMO To: Steven Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending October 11, 2013

Government Shut Down Preparation: Babcock & Wilcox Pantex (B&W) has submitted a plan to the NNSA Production Office addressing the orderly shutdown of operations due to the ongoing appropriation issues within the Federal government. B&W is working to complete all nuclear explosive operations to the point where the nuclear explosives are in transportable configurations prior to the plant shut down. This means that nuclear explosives will be within an Enhanced Transportation Container-1, an Enhanced Transportation Container-2, or a shipping container. B&W is converting some operating facilities into staging facilities and expects to have most operating facilities evacuated prior to shutting down.

B&W will have personnel on site to perform emerging maintenance activities and Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) surveillance requirements. B&W plans to maintain all surveillance requirements except hoist inspections. The hoists will not be used during the shutdown and those with expired surveillance requirements will be locked out.

Conduct of Operations Event Update: Late last week, B&W resumed use of two-way radios by all personnel. (See report for 10/4/2013.) B&W Authorization Basis personnel determined that the hazard analysis for the use of these radios by all site personnel was captured in the Transportation Safety Analysis Report (SAR). B&W's analysis is specific to transportation routes on site and does not address the event last week where a Special Mechanical Inspector left a two-way radio in a nuclear facility personnel interlock. It does address the general question of maintenance personnel use of two-way radios in the Material Access Area. B&W addresses the use of two-way radios in the personnel interlock and nuclear facilities in the Supplemental Equipment Program within the Sitewide SAR and did not consider this event a programmatic breakdown.

Unauthorized Movement of Trackable Material: This week, B&W moved two trackable material items without dispatching them in the Move Right system. The items were not accepted at the receiving facility and were moved back to the originating facility. Although the two items are trackable material items, they contain less than Hazard Category 3 quantities of special nuclear material. Therefore, B&W did not consider the unauthorized move a violation of the Technical Safety Requirement. The move originated in a non-nuclear facility, which is why B&W does not believe this could have happened to the movement of a nuclear explosive.